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Abstract
Older Americans, even those who are long retired, have strong willingness to work, especially in jobs
with flexible schedules. For many, labor force participation near or after normal retirement age is
limited more by a lack of acceptable job opportunities or low expectations about finding them than
by unwillingness to work longer. This paper establishes these findings using an approach to identifi-
cation based on strategic survey questions (SSQs) purpose-designed to complement behavioral data.
These findings suggest that demand-side factors are important in explaining late-in-life labor mar-
ket behavior and may be the most appropriate target for policy aimed at promoting working longer.
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1 Introduction
In many advanced economies, the share of the population that is of working age (age 20–64) is projected
to fall significantly in the coming decades. In the U.S., for example, the fraction of the population
age 65 or older will rise from around 20 percent of the working age population in 2007 to 40 percent
by 2050 (Gruber and Wise, 1998, 2007, OECD, 2006). This dramatic shift poses several economic
challenges, notably increased financial strain on public pensions and Medicare (Fuchs, 1984, De Nardi,
Imrohoroglu, and Sargent, 1999, Lee and Skinner, 1999, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser, 2002,
Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante, 2007).
In response to population aging, many countries are starting to enact or at least consider policies
that encourage older workers to work longer. The appropriate policy depends on whether observed
patterns of late-in-life labor market behavior more reflect the demand or the supply side of the labor
market. Given the importance of separately identifying supply- and demand-side forces, significant
research effort has been dedicated to this question. Yet answers remain elusive because there is no
obvious behavioral imprint of frustrated desires. On the supply side, lack of employment beyond
historically normal retirement ages may represent older workers’ low willingness to continue to work
under current market and institutional incentives. On the demand side, employers might be unwilling
to adapt pay or work schedules to accommodate changes in older workers’ abilities or desires. Analyses
of behavioral data typically require strong assumptions to generate estimates of structural parameters
that separately identify causal factors. There is limited credible exogenous variation in the data
concerning opportunities to work. Moreover little is known about the opportunity sets generating
observed retirement behavior, and many of the choices are confounded by shocks, such as to health of
workers or health of firms.
In this paper we introduce an approach to separating supply- and demand-side forces using strate-
gic survey questions (SSQs). These are stated preference questions custom-designed to complement
available behavioral data on labor market outcomes. Building on previous work using similar types
of survey questions (Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro, 1997, Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer and van
Nieuwerburgh, 2011, Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro and Tonetti, 2016), we designed the SSQs to
be comprehensible and meaningful to respondents. We implemented the SSQs in the Vanguard Re-
search Initiative (VRI), a panel of American Vanguard clients more than 55 years old. These SSQs are
not confounded by perceived job opportunities. They directly control for job opportunities in hypo-
thetical situations, which allows us to identify willingness to work independent from what workers can
expect to find available in the actual labor market. Indeed, we explicitly pose questions that allow us
to estimate willingness to work in arrangements that may not currently be prevalent, involving, in par-
ticular, a flexible schedule. The SSQ approach is particularly useful in the context of late-in-life work
where the gap between the desired and available opportunities may play a more important role. In
particular, given the evidence on part-time options being relatively more common among post-career
bridge jobs (Maestas, 2010 and Rupert and Zanella, 2015) or self-employment (Ramnath, Shoven, and
Slavov, 2017), we seek to answer whether older workers would take up jobs with flexible schedules
even if that is not part of their current opportunity set.
We find that older workers would work longer if schedules were flexible. Based on the SSQs that
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offer the option to work shorter hours, many workers would take up this option, even if it involved a
more than proportional reduction in earnings. Older Americans, even those who are long retired, have
a strong willingness to work, especially in a job with a flexible schedule.
• About 40 percent of retirees, mostly in their late 60s or 70s, are willing to work again at the
time of the survey if all the conditions are the same as their last job, including hourly wage,
total number of hours, and type of job.
• Willingness to work becomes much stronger if they can choose hours flexibly instead of having
to work the same number of hours as in their last job on a fixed schedule. About 60 percent of
retirees would be willing to return to work with a flexible schedule. Furthermore, 20 percent of
retirees would be willing to take more than a 20 percent hourly wage reduction to do so. This
preference for a flexible work schedule is also consistent with actual labor-market transitions of
VRI respondents: A flexible schedule is more common in post-career, pre-retirement bridge jobs
than career jobs and is commonly reported as a desired characteristic in respondents’ post-career
job searches.
If individuals would be willing to work longer were jobs flexible, what then explains the low
equilibrium incidence of part-time work late in life? SSQs provide credible evidence of latent labor
supply. Consequently, the findings of the paper strongly support the implication that employers do
not find it profitable to employ older workers later-in-life on part-time schedules. Further research
is required to establish the source of this low labor demand, e.g., declining productivity with age,
lower productivity of workers when not on full-time schedules, or interactions of these factors. The
implication that labor demand plays an important role is, however, not just supposition. This paper
provides evidence that many older workers would be willing to trade lower wage rates for preferred
work schedules. So even though the paper does not have direct evidence on labor demand, its price
and quantity findings from the supply side quantify the strength of the demand-side factors needed to
explain why the modal U.S. worker transitions directly from full-time work to complete retirement.
To quantify the supply and demand factors that generate labor market patterns, we use SSQs to
estimate parameters of the late-in-life labor supply model developed in Rogerson and Wallenius (2013,
RW hereafter). Many workers directly transition from a full-time career job to complete retirement.
Preferences for smoothing leisure would imply a more gradual decline in labor supply. The RW model
addresses the challenge this work pattern poses to standard theories of labor market outcomes. In the
RW model, a preference for a smooth lifecycle profile of leisure consumption, and therefore distaste
for abrupt retirement, can be overcome by either a very high intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(IES) for labor or strong nonconvexity in production that limits part-time employment opportunities.
As RW note, separately identifying these two factors is difficult, and the IES values estimated from
retirement transitions critically depend on the strength of the assumed nonconvexities. In addition to
providing new measures of willingness to work, the SSQs are (by design) particularly informative of
structural parameters that govern late-in-life labor market behavior. Our estimates suggest preferences
for smoothing labor that are generally in line with prior estimates, providing further evidence that
a lack of acceptable job opportunities, likely due to a nonconvexity in production, accounts for the
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discrete labor force exits. Furthermore, by directly estimating the IES using SSQs, we place bounds on
the size of the production nonconvexities needed to explain observed labor market life-cycle patterns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of
our sample and survey. In Section 3 we analyze the observed late-in-life labor market behavior of
our sample, focusing on evidence that flexibility in the work schedule is associated with Americans
working longer. Section 4 introduces the SSQs and documents the reservation wages at which workers
would accept job offers of various types. In Section 5 we address the challenge of separately identifying
demand- and supply-side factors based on the RW model and use the SSQs to place bounds on the
nonconvexities on the production side that discourages part-time work. We discuss related literature
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Sample and Survey
This paper uses the Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI), a linked survey-administrative data panel
drawn from account holders at The Vanguard Group, Inc., a leading investment management company.
The VRI is composed of a sample of account holders at Vanguard who are at least 55 years old, have at
least $10,000 at their Vanguard accounts (to ensure their non-trivial engagement with Vanguard), and
have internet access enabling them to complete the online surveys. We refer to Ameriks, Caplin, Lee,
Shapiro and Tonetti (2014) for more detailed descriptions of the sample selection criteria, summaries
of demographic and financial variables, and comparison to other data sets.
VRI Survey 4, which studies labor market participation and retirement, is the primary data source
for this paper.1 This survey consists of two parts. The first gathers a detailed history of employment
and search behavior, extending the job history battery from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS)
to cover retirement paths and employment in post-career bridge jobs. The second section of the survey
comprises the SSQs analyzed in Section 4.
Before discussing our main survey results, we first provide summary statistics for the 2,772 re-
spondents who completed VRI Survey 4. Table 1 shows selected sample characteristics including age,
financial wealth, marital status, and education levels. This sample is wealthier, healthier, and more
educated than a representative population. Ages are distributed approximately equally in age bins
55–59, 60–64, 65–69, 70–74, and 75+, the median household has about $800,000 of financial wealth,
67% have a partner, 34% are female, 76% have a college degree or higher, and 95% report having good
health or better. Although these differences diminish when compared to the HRS subsample that meet
the VRI sample selection criteria (Appendix Table A.1), the VRI remains slightly more educated and
healthier. However, because VRI participants remain healthier longer and have higher human capital
(as proxied by education), this sample represents a population strata that likely remain productive
longer and for whom understanding sudden labor force withdrawals is particularly policy relevant.
Table 2 presents summary statistics on employment status and age at the time of the survey. Labor
force participation patterns look broadly similar to those of the general population (see Appendix
Table A.2 for comparison to HRS). In particular, we observe a significant decrease in participation
1To date, five VRI surveys have been administered. Survey 4 was administered in October 2015. See http://
ebp-projects.isr.umich.edu/VRI/survey_overview.html for more details.
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Table 1: VRI respondent characteristics
Age and Wealth
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Age: 60 64 69 75 79 70
Financial wealth: 172,665 394,041 821,252 1,495,714 2,621,855 1,248,491
Married Education
Yes No < College College > College
67% 33% 24% 32% 44%
Sex Health
Excellent/ Fair/
Female Male Very Good Good Poor
34% 66% 73% 22% 5%
Notes: Survey 4 respondents. N=2,772. Financial wealth is from Survey 1 and adjusted to 2015 $.
between age 60 and 65, the primary ages at which individuals qualify for public and private pensions.
Furthermore, the labor force participation rate falls to 27% between ages 65-69, and falls even further
after age 70. Finally, among individuals who are not working, very few consider themselves not
completely retired, with the relative share in this category diminishing with age.
Table 2: Labor force participation status
By Age Total
55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75+
Retired, completely (%) 11.0 32.8 68.1 82.6 90.3 64.7
Retired, not completely (%) 2.9 5.4 4.8 5.1 3.6 4.5
Not retired (%) 86.1 61.9 27.1 12.3 6.2 30.8
N 273 522 646 632 699 2,772
In the survey the career job is defined as the longest or main job respondents held after age 40,
while a bridge job is any job held after leaving the career job.2 Appendix Table B.1 presents key
characteristics of career jobs of the sample, separately for those who retired from their career jobs
and those who are still working on their career jobs. Most of the career jobs are full time jobs. The
most common number of working hours is 2,080 per year, which is 40 hours per week for 52 weeks.
Respondents typically worked for fairly long in their career jobs. More than half of the sample worked
for more than 20 years. The most common industry is professional, scientific, and technical services
2When respondents have multiple bridge jobs, the survey focuses on the most recent one.
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while the most common occupation is management. Self-employment is rare. Most did not have a
flexible schedule. We find similar career job characteristics from the VRI-eligible HRS sample (see
Appendix Table A.4).
In the next section we provide more details on the employment patterns, retirement paths, and
job search decisions of our sample.
3 Labor Market Activity After a Career Job: The Role of Flexible
Schedules
In this section we present two main findings from our measures of historical employment and job search
behaviors. First, about half of our sample reveal interest in working after exiting a career job by either
searching for or securing such employment. Second, when searching for post-career employment, older
workers prioritize flexibility in their work schedule. These findings derive from data on bridge jobs,
career jobs, and post-career job search behavior.
3.1 Bridge Jobs
Though a sudden withdrawal from the labor force around the typical retirement age is the most
common retirement pattern in our sample, a significant fraction of the sample work beyond age 65
either on their career job or a bridge job.3 Of 2,772 respondents, we find that 2,146 respondents have
separated from their career jobs, with 811 of these individuals engaging in a post-career bridge job.
Given that some might still return to the labor market, this is clearly a lower bound. Hence, the
38% of VRI respondents that had a bridge job in the VRI is roughly comparable to the 52% of HRS
respondents documented in Maestas (2010).
Characteristics of bridge jobs and how they compare to those of career jobs hint at which job
characteristics are valued by older Americans. Table 3 compares the the characteristics of the bridge
jobs and career jobs for the respondents who did have a bridge job.4 There are several notable patterns
in this table. First, wages and hours of bridge jobs are both lower than those of the career job. Second,
we observe that bridge jobs are more likely to be self-employed (23%, compared to 6% in career jobs)
and more likely to have a flexible work schedule (54%, compared to 24% in career jobs). Third, bridge
jobs are much less likely to provide health insurance, which may reflect older workers being eligible
for Medicare. The share of bridge jobs with health insurance provision indeed drops at age 65, when
workers become eligible for Medicare, from 54% to 35%. Taken altogether, Table 3 suggests that older
workers desire a change to a job with less burden of work and greater flexibility in work schedule, but
accept lower earnings and benefits.
While suggestive, the above patterns do not clearly indicate workers’ preference for more flexible
employment. Alternatively, workers might need to change to industries or occupations where flexible
schedules are more common to successfully find post-career employment. We indeed observe that a
3Recall that the survey defines the career job as the longest and most important job held since age 40. The survey
asks about one subsequent job (if any)—either the current job for those still working or the last job. We define this
post-career job as the bridge job for this analysis.
4See Appendix Table B.1 for characteristics of the career jobs for the entire sample.
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Table 3: Comparison: bridge jobs vs. career jobs
Hours and Earning
Ratio of Bridge/Career
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p
Hours 0.06 0.21 0.74 1 1
Hourly wage 0.19 0.44 0.80 1.14 1.7
Annual salary 0.03 0.10 0.44 0.87 1.18
Job Characteristics, Career to Bridge
Self- Flexible Health Insurance
Employed Schedule Provided
Career Bridge Career Bridge Career Bridge
6.4% 23.3% 24.0% 53.5% 87.8% 41.0%
Notes: N=812. Characteristics of career versus bridge jobs for respondents with bridge jobs.
significant fraction of bridge jobs entail a change in industry (43.6%) or occupation (35.1%), though
drastic changes in occupation characteristics are less common (Table 4, Panel A).5
To address these confounding effects, we examine whether the likelihood of obtaining flexibility in
the work schedule on the bridge job depends on whether the worker changed industry or occupation
(Table 4, Panel B). Those who change either industry or occupation are indeed more likely to have
a flexible schedule on bridge jobs, but the difference is very small. Slightly more than half gained
flexibility when they changed industry (51%) or occupation (53%). The numbers are smaller but similar
for those who stayed in the same industry (44%) or in the same occupation (44%). Changing occupation
category does not significantly affect the likelihood of gaining flexibility in the work schedule. In
Appendix B.2 we provide more detailed analysis of the transitions between industries and occupations
on the one hand and changes in the share of flexible jobs within each industry and occupation on the
other hand, confirming this broad conclusion. We conclude that changes in industry or occupation do
not explain the increased prevalence of flexible schedules in bridge jobs.
3.2 Job Search after Career Job
The willingness to work reflected in the actual job history analyzed above is likely underestimated,
both because some workers may still find post-career-job employment after we fielded the survey and
because some workers desiring bridge jobs might not have been able to find one. To provide further
5To examine changes in occupation characteristics, we classify occupations into three categories based on the type of
abilities most required per occupation: human capital, social capital, and physical strength. The classification is based
on a principal component analysis on the list of required abilities from ONET.
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Table 4: Changes in industry/occupation and fraction who gained flexibility in schedule
A: Changes in Industry/Occupation
Yes No
Changed Industry 43.6% 56.4%
Changed Occupation 35.1% 64.9%
Changed Occupation Category* 26.7% 73.3%
B: Fraction Who Gained Flexibility
Conditional on:
Changed Changed Changed
Industry Occupation Occ. Category
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Gained Flexibility: 51.1% 44.3% 53.0% 44.3% 47.7% 46.6%
Stayed Fixed-Schedule: 48.9% 55.7% 47.0% 55.7% 52.3% 53.4%
Notes. Panel A tabulates the share of workers who changed industry, occupation, or occupation category between career
and bridge jobs. It includes every respondent who had a bridge job (N=812).
Panel B calculates the share of respondents who obtained flexibility in work schedule in the bridge job, conditional on
whether they changed industry/occupation or not. The panel includes the subset who did not have a flexible schedule in
their career jobs (N= 617).
*We define three broad occupation categories based on the type of abilities most required per occupation: human capital,
social capital, and physical strength. The classification is based on a principal component analysis on the list of required
abilities from ONET.
insight into willingness to work and more information on the job characteristics that are desired and
not just found, we turn now to job search behavior.6
Among those who directly transitioned to complete retirement after their career jobs, only 11%
(147 out of 1,336) report having looked for a new job opportunity. In contrast, 80% (657 out of 812) of
those who had a bridge job actively looked for such an opportunity, while only 20% of workers received
their bridge job passively. Thus, most workers who report having searched actively successfully found
employment. This suggests either that most retirees are not interested in post-career employment or
that they are not interested in the jobs they believe themselves likely to find.
Table 5 summarizes what job characteristics individuals looked for when they searched. We find
further suggestive evidence that flexibility is an important characteristic for workers pursuing bridge
jobs, with 40% wanting flexibility in deciding the number of hours and 31% wanting flexibility in how
to allocate these hours. Furthermore, 33% wanted less responsibility, suggesting pursuit of jobs that
are less burdensome, while 30% wanted to be more of their own boss. We also find strong heterogeneity
in what older workers look for—there is no single characteristic that was searched for by more than
6See Faberman, Mueller, Sahin, and Topa (2017), who also field an original survey to study job search behavior and
labor market outcomes.
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40%, and all considered characteristics, except for better health insurance, were searched for by at
least 10% of the sample.
Table 5: Search behavior: what workers looked
for
Characteristic % looked for
Change life:
Different industry 23.5
Different occupation 27.4
Move to a better location 20.8
Flexibility:
More flexible hours 39.9
More flexible schedule 31.0
Autonomy:
Less responsibility 32.5
More of my own boss 29.7
Other job characteristics:
More pay 19.9
Less commuting time 25.1
More job security 15.3
Better health insurance 7.8
Notes: N=804. Respondents who searched after career job.
Overall, these findings echo those from analyzing bridge jobs held: flexibility appears to be an
important factor among those considering working after their career jobs.
4 Measurement of Willingness to Work Using SSQs
Both post-career employment and search behavior reflect not only older Americans’ willingness to work
but also their perception of available jobs in the market. In this section we introduce and analyze
measures of individual preference parameters that identify factors affecting labor supply. The SSQs
we pose directly control for job opportunities in hypothetical situations. This allows us to identify
willingness to work independent of what workers expect to or are able to find available in the actual
labor market. By measuring labor supply in different working environments, we can quantify workers’
interest in considered job characteristics. In addition to presenting details of SSQ design and the
information they contain on willingness to work, we also present a number of internal and external
validation checks on the responses.
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4.1 Design of SSQs
The basic structure of the SSQs is as follows. We construct the “reference job” based on the character-
istics of the most recent job the respondent had (recorded from the first part of the survey). Hence,
the reference job is the career job for those who did not have a bridge job and it is the last bridge
job for those who had a bridge job. The hypothetical job opportunities in the SSQs are different from
the reference job in at most one dimension at a time. Anchoring hypothetical job opportunities to
the job characteristics from actual work history helps respondents put themselves in the hypothesized
situation and also links their SSQ responses to the actual choices they have made.
For each hypothetical job opportunity, a respondent is first asked whether he would accept it at
the suggested salary that is set to be the same as that in the reference job. If the respondent says he
would accept the offer, then we further ask what is the lowest salary at which he would still accept
the offer. If the respondent says he would not accept the offer, then we further ask what is the lowest
salary at which he would switch to accepting the offer. This reservation wage allows us to quantify
the willingness to work of the respondents under each circumstance.
We illustrate key features of the SSQs by presenting one in detail. The other SSQs are very similar,
but differ either in terms of the timing of the offer or the considered job characteristics. In this SSQ,
the hypothetical job characteristics are the same as those from the reference job except that the
hypothetical job does not allow any flexibility in the work schedule. Respondents have to work exactly
the same number of hours for the following year as in the reference job, regardless of whether the
reference job actually allowed for flexibility in work schedule or not (we call this the “fixed schedule”
scenario). The SSQ asks whether respondents would accept such a job opportunity if it were available
at the time of the survey.
To be specific, the following is the text that is shown to the respondents:
In the questions that follow, we are interested in what you would choose if you were to have
certain decisions to make about your employment situation. While the choices that we describe
are hypothetical, we ask you to do your best to assess what you would choose if you were to
face these choices today.
In the scenario that follows, you will be asked to make a choice between Options A and B.
Option A will be to immediately accept a specified employment opportunity that will be open
only for a short window (say one week) and will then become unavailable. Option B is instead to
pursue other possibilities including searching for another employment situation or not working.
• Option A is a new employment situation that involves a fixed work schedule. Other
than this possible difference, the new employment situation matches your reference
employment situation in terms of occupation, annual earnings, and all other charac-
teristics.
• Option B is instead to pursue other possibilities including searching for another employ-
ment situation or not working.
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To better clarify the situation, the question provides additional details:
• Option A matches your reference employment situation not only in terms of occu-
pation, annual earnings, and current work schedule, but also in all other aspects that are
important to you that are not specified in the above table [that summarizes the reference
job characteristics].
• If you choose Option B, Option A is no longer available.
• If you choose Option A you will be able at any later point to quit and to pursue other
possibilities, including searching for another employment situation or not working.
• Pay in Option A changes over time as you would expect it to in your reference position.
• [Omitted if single] In this choice and in all that follow, please suppose that your spouse
behaves in a manner that is consistent with your choices. If your spouse’s employment
situation would differ depending on whether you choose Option A or Option B, please
take this dependence into account in answering the question.
Then the respondent is asked to choose between Option A and Option B. If the respondent chose
Option A (Option B), he is further asked:7
• Starting at the reference salary, imagine that earnings for Option A were to decline
(increase). What earnings level for Option A would be just low (high) enough that you
would switch to Option B (Option A)?
To investigate what job characteristics older individuals value, we asked additional SSQs with
alternative hypothetical job opportunities that are different than the above in one dimension at a
time. Considered alternative characteristics include allowing for a flexible schedule (respondents can
choose the number of hours per year instead of having to work for the same number of hours as in the
reference job) and allowing for an alternative occupation (the opportunity comes with an occupation
that is different than the reference occupation and is the most preferred one by respondents). The
SSQs also vary in terms of the timing of the offer (offer available at the time of the survey, SSQ1A,
versus a retrospective offer assumed to have been available at the time of retirement, SSQ1B). They
also vary in whether the offer is a new employment situation (SSQ1A, SSQ1B) or a continuation of
the current employment situation (SSQ2). Table 6 lists the SSQs asked. Detailed scenarios for the
other SSQs are available in Appendix C. In this section we focus on respondents who are currently
not working, because our focus is on measuring willingness to come back to the labor market among
retirees. Therefore we analyze SSQ1A and SSQ1B only. (The analysis of SSQ2, which was fielded
to those who were employed at the time of the survey, is presented in Appendix D.) There are 1,771
retirees. We divide this group further into those who never had a bridge job and those who had a
bridge job because these two groups may have different preferences for labor supply and the reference
7Feldstein and Poterba (1984), Holzer (1986), and Krueger and Mueller (2016) use a similar survey approach to elicit
the reservation wages of unemployed workers.
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job is different across these two groups (1,337 respondents without a bridge job and 434 respondents
with a bridge job). The reference job is the career job for those who did not have a bridge job and it
is the last bridge job for those who had a bridge job.
Table 6: SSQs
Name Time Considered job characteristics Sample asked Sample size
SSQ 1A Survey Fixed schedule, Flexible schedule All 2,758
Alternative occupation
SSQ 1B Retirement Fixed schedule, Flexible schedule Retirees 1,740
Alternative occupation
SSQ 2 Survey Fixed schedule, Flexible schedule Workers 754
Search after separation allowed
Search after separation not allowed
Notes: Time refers to the reference period of the SSQ, which is either current (time of the survey), or retrospec-
tive (time of retirement). In SSQ 1A, those who are employed at the time of the survey are asked to imagine that
their current employment situations immediately terminate in a manner that does not affect their prospects for
future employment. The intention is to make them actively consider post-career employment situations. In SSQ2,
they are asked whether they would continue to work in the current job if the characteristics of the job change in
the way assumed in the scenarios. Respondents are allowed to skip the SSQs. The item non-response rate was
almost zero conditional on completing the survey.
4.2 Willingness to Work at the Time of the Survey
In this subsection, by using the SSQs with hypothetical job opportunities that are available at the
time of the survey (SSQ1A), we confirm that older Americans have a strong willingness to work even
when they cannot choose the number of hours they work. We also confirm that allowing a flexible
work schedule boosts the willingness to work significantly further.
Fixed Schedule Scenario
Even in the fixed schedule scenario, where the respondents have to work the same number of hours as in
the reference job, the acceptance rate is fairly high. Figure 1 plots the acceptance rate in this scenario.
About one third of those who retired with no bridge job (Panel (a)) accept this offer while 44 percent of
those who had a bridge job (Panel (b)) accept it. Acceptance means that the respondent would come
back to the labor market at a salary that is the same as in the reference job. The acceptance rate for
the former group is surprisingly high, given that the vast majority of them (89 percent) did not even
search for a new job opportunity after quitting their career jobs (and stayed retired until the time of
the survey). This demonstrates that, at least for these individuals, non-participation in the labor force
is driven not by their lack of interest in working, but by a (perceived) lack of job opportunities that
are as attractive as their reference jobs. A non-negligible fraction of the sample are willing to work
even at a lower wage than that they used to earn. Twenty percent of those who did not have a bridge
job and 30% of those who did are willing to accept a 10% wage reduction to work in the hypothesized
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Figure 1: Would current retirees return to work under a fixed work schedule?
(a) Sample had no bridge job (b) Sample had a bridge job
Note: N=1,337 for Panel (a) and 434 for Panel (b). Wage reduction is calculated relative to the wage of the
reference job.
situation. Even with a 20% wage reduction, some respondents (10% and 20% respectively for each
group) are still willing to work.
Figure 2: Would current retirees return to work under a flexible work schedule?
(a) Sample had no bridge job (b) Sample had a bridge job
Note: N=1,337 for Panel (a) and 434 for Panel (b). Wage reduction is calculated relative to the wage of the
reference job.
Flexible Schedule Scenario
When the hypothetical offer adds flexibility by allowing the respondent to adjust the number of working
hours, willingness to work increases even more. In Figure 2, the blue bar is the acceptance rate from
the fixed schedule scenario, while the yellow bar is the increase in the acceptance rate in the flexible
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schedule compared to the fixed schedule. When the schedule is flexible, at the reference hourly wage,
more than half of the sample would accept the offer. This is half as many again as with the fixed
schedule. The increase in the acceptance rate in both groups is about 20 percentage points. This
means that 20% did not want to work under a fixed schedule at this hourly wage, but they are willing
to work if they can choose the number of hours at the same hourly wage. Moreover, many are willing
to accept a significant wage reduction as long as they can choose their own work schedule. About 10%
more retirees are willing to take a 10% wage reduction compared to the fixed schedule scenario, for
example.
Figure 3 presents the full distribution of the reservations wages, normalized as a fraction of the
wage from the reference job. For any value of the reservation wage between 50% and 150% of the
reference wage, the acceptance rate is higher (i.e., the CDF is higher) when the offer comes with a
flexible schedule. In both scenarios, the slope of the distribution, hence the extensive margin elasticity,
is the largest going from 70% to 100% of the reference wage.
Figure 3: Reservation wage distribution of current retirees
(a) Sample had no bridge job (b) Sample had a bridge job
Note: Reservation wage is calculated as a fraction of the wage they had in the reference job. The figure plots
the CDF of reservation wages in the range between 0.5 and 1.5.
Conditional on accepting the offer with a flexible schedule at the reference hourly wage, we find
an overall tendency to reduce work, with a large degree of heterogeneity in the desired change in
hours worked (Table 7, Panel A). At median, they want 10% fewer hours than the reference schedule,
showing that for most retirees, their preference for a flexible work schedule is associated with a modest
desired reduction in the number of hours.
Alternative Occupation Scenario
The last scenario in SSQ1A allows a respondent to pick an alternative occupation. When asked
whether they can think of any occupation that they prefer to what they used to have in the reference
job, about 40% of retirees said yes. Conditional on having an alternative occupation in mind, the
acceptance rate is much higher when the offer is made in that occupation: at the reference hourly
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Table 7: Desired reduction in hours (%)
A. Time of the Survey (SSQ1A)
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p N
Had no bridge job -15.4 0 11.4 44.6 69.6 710
Had a bridge job -11.8 0 9.4 39.7 62.5 291
B. Time of retirement (SSQ1B)
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p N
Had no bridge job -2.9 0 19.2 50.0 71.2 545
Had a bridge job 0 0 7.7 27.3 50.0 294
Notes: This table includes respondents who would accept the offer of a flexible schedule
at the reference hourly wage.
wage, it is higher than 70% for both groups of retirees (see Appendix Figure D.1 for more detail.)
In summary, these SSQs allow us to identify a strong and prevalent willingness to work among older
Americans who are already retired. At least one third of retirees report being willing to work again
as long as they can find a job that has similar characteristics as the last job they had. Many of
them are even willing to take a significant wage reduction to work again in that circumstance. This
is a much stronger willingness to work than that revealed in the behavioral data only. In particular,
for the group who never had a bridge job, only 11% of them searched for a job opportunity after
quitting the career job, but one third of them would be willing to work again in a job that has similar
characteristics as their last. By controlling for available job opportunities in hypothetical situations,
the SSQs uncover additional willingness to work that was hidden behind individuals’ low expectations
of finding a suitable job in behavioral data.
We also find that older Americans have a strong preference for having control of their own work
schedule. A majority of retirees would work if they could find a job with a flexible schedule in what is
otherwise the same job as their last job. Indeed, many of them would take a significant wage reduction
to work with their preferred schedule. For those who can think of a preferred alternative occupation
to that which they used to have, allowing for a job opportunity in that occupation also boosts their
willingness to work.
Strong willingness to work is not confined to a specific age group. Indeed we find that the acceptance
rates in each scenario are fairly similar across all the age groups where we have dense observations
(i.e., between early 60s and late 70s). This again suggests that demand-side factors play an important
role for the sudden withdrawal from the labor force of individuals in their mid to late 60s.
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4.3 Willingness to Work at the Time of Retirement
The second set of SSQs (SSQ1B) concern hypothetical job opportunities that were made available
at the time of retirement (i.e., immediately after they separated from their last job).8 The intention
is to investigate which hypothetical job opportunities would have changed their decision to retire.
The survey employed the same three scenarios as in SSQ1A: fixed schedule; flexible schedule; and
alternative occupation.
Figure 4 summarizes the acceptance rates from the fixed and flexible schedule scenarios. Overall
patterns are similar to what we found from SSQ1A. Even when the offer does not allow for any
flexibility in schedule, the acceptance rate is fairly high at the reference wage. It is 30% for those
who retired from their career jobs and 60% for those who retired from their bridge jobs. Some are
willing to take a significant wage reduction if they could have such a job opportunity right after they
left their last job. 20% of those who retired from their career jobs and 40% of those who retired from
their bridge jobs are willing to take at least a 10% wage reduction.
Figure 4: Would current retirees have continued to work?
(a) Sample had no bridge job (b) Sample had a bridge job
Note: N=1,226 for Panel (a) and 432 for Panel (b). Wage reduction is calculated relative to the wage of the
last job.
Allowing for a flexible schedule again increases willingness to work, but the effect is smaller at the
time of retirement than at the time of the survey. At the reference wage, it increases the acceptance
rate by 10 percentage points for both groups compared to the fixed schedule scenario, which is still
significant but smaller than the 20 percentage point increase we saw from the questions asked at the
time of the survey. The effect is even smaller when there is a wage reduction of 10% or more.
For those who retired directly from their career job, the smaller effect is due to a lower acceptance
rate for a job with a flexible schedule at the time of retirement. This may suggest a certain amount
of burn-out (Maestas and Li, 2007, Jacobs and Piyapromdee, 2016): some respondents did not even
8For those who are retired within the last two years, the survey did not ask SSQ1B because for them the situation
in SSQ1B is similar to that in SSQ1A.
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want to work part time immediately after leaving their career job. Indeed, the acceptance rate for the
opportunity with a flexible schedule at the time of the survey (SSQ1A) was 10% lower among those
who have been in retirement for less than two years than that from those who have been in retirement
for longer, further suggesting burn-out. On the other hand, for those whose reference job is a bridge
job, the smaller effect is due to a higher acceptance rate for a fixed schedule job. This may suggest
that they had already adjusted hours as desired in the bridge job.9 These patterns are also clear from
the full distribution of the reservation wages (Figure 5). At the time of retirement (the solid curves),
the reservation wages tend to be lower when the offer comes with a flexible schedule, but the gap
between the two curves is smaller than that from the time of the survey (the dashed curves). The
extensive margin elasticity is again the largest from 70% to 100% of the reference wage.
Figure 5: Reservation wage distribution at the time of retirement
(a) Sample had no bridge job (b) Sample had a bridge job
Note: Reservation wage is calculated as a fraction of the wage they had in the reference job. The figure plots
the CDF of reservation wages in the range between 0.5 and 1.5. The figure also shows the distributions from
SSQ1A for the corresponding scenarios and groups in dashed curves for comparison.
The responses to the alternative occupation scenario are also very similar to those from SSQ1A.
About one third of the respondents could think of an occupation that they preferred to their reference
occupation, and conditioning on having a preferred occupation, about two thirds of them would have
accepted the offer at the reference wage (see Appendix Figure D.2 for more details).
4.4 Robustness and Credibility
Credibility of the findings in this paper hinges on the quality of responses to the SSQs. In the absence of
a pecuniary incentive to elicit truthful and accurate survey responses as is typical in field experiments
(e.g., Mas and Pallais, 2016), careful design of survey questions and ex-post tests on responses are
necessary to make sure that respondents paid enough attention to and understood the hypothesized
9Conditional on being willing to accept the offer at the reference hourly wage, the desired reduction in working hours
at the time of retirement is slightly larger for those who retired from a career job and slightly smaller for those who
retired from a bridge job, compared to what it was at the point of answering the survey (Table 7, Panel B).
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situations and also that the responses reflect true preferences as manifested in measured behavior. As
part of the survey design, we implemented a pilot survey with a small sample who provided us detailed
feedback on the SSQs that helped improve the main survey. In addition, we support credibility of
the SSQ responses using a number of internal and external consistency tests. This subsection reports
the results of five such tests. The first two tests confirm internal consistency of the SSQ responses.
The third test confirms understanding of the hypothetical situation by reporting results from the
comprehension tests that were implemented during the survey. The last two tests show that the SSQ
responses are related to certain observed behaviors in a reasonable manner.
4.4.1 Consistency in Responses
SSQ1A and SSQ1B ask about the same types of job but differ in the timing of the offer: SSQ1A asks
at the time of the survey and SSQ1B asks at the time of retirement. If the responses truly reflect the
respondents’ preferences, we expect there to be a positive correlation between the responses for the
same job characteristics between SSQ1A and SSQ1B.
For both fixed and flexible schedule scenarios, the extensive margin choices are strongly positively
correlated between SSQ1A and SSQ1B. If a respondent accepts the offer in SSQ1A then he is more
likely to do the same in SSQ1B. The correlation between the SSQ1A and SSQ1B responses is 0.42 for
a fixed schedule scenario and 0.45 for a flexible schedule scenario, where the t-statistic for the null of
no correlation is 19.7 for the former and 21.1 for the latter.
4.4.2 Reasonableness of Responses
If the response switches from accept to do not accept when we make the offer more attractive either
by allowing for a flexible schedule or an alternative occupation under the same level of offered salary,
then it can be considered unreasonable. In Table 8, we calculate the share of unreasonable responses,
in various questions.
We find that the share of unreasonable responses is small. It is less than 4 percent under any
comparison. The share is still small even when we consider only the switchers, defined as responses
that change at the extensive margin between the two scenarios considered. For each comparison,
between one fifth to a quarter of respondents switched their responses. More than 80% of switchers
switch in the expected direction, in all cases.
4.4.3 Comprehension Test Results
Given the intensive use of hypothetical situations in the SSQs, it is important to check whether the
respondents fully understood the assumed scenarios before they answered the SSQs. Whenever the
survey introduces a new type of scenario, it asks a set of comprehension tests to verify that respondents
understood the assumed scenario or associated rules correctly. If the respondents do not correctly
answer all questions on at the first trial, the questions they missed are repeated. If they missed after
the second trial, they are told the right answer.
Table 9 summarizes the results of the comprehension tests (the number of questions correctly
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Table 8: Reasonable Responses: Share of unreasonable changes in responses (%)
Share of unreasonable changes in responses
Among all responses Among switchers
SSQ1A (Allowing for flexible schedule) 1.9 7.9
SSQ1A (Allowing for alternative occupation) 1.7 6.1
SSQ1B (Allowing for flexible schedule) 3.3 18.8
SSQ1B (Allowing for alternative occupation) 3.5 16.6
Note: Switchers are defined as those who change their responses between the two scenarios considered.
answered after the second trial). Median respondents answer almost all questions correctly even in
the first trial. At the second trial, respondents rarely miss any of the questions. This confirms that
the respondents were paying attention during the survey and they did not have much difficulty in
understanding the assumed hypothetical scenarios.
Table 9: Comprehension test results
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p N
SSQ1A-Fixed schedule (Best score: 7 for married and 6 for singles)
First trial (married) 3 4 6 6 7 1,835
Second trial (married) 5 6 7 7 7 1,835
First trial (singles) 3 4 5 6 6 923
Second trial (singles) 5 5 6 6 6 923
SSQ1A-Flexible schedule (Best score: 4)
First trial 2 3 4 4 4 2,757
Second trial 3 4 4 4 4 2,757
SSQ1A-Alternative occupation (Best score: 3)
First trial 2 2 3 3 3 1,264
Second trial 3 3 3 3 3 1,264
Note: Married are respondents who are married or in a relationship shar-
ing financial decisionmaking. Best score means all the answers are correct.
4.4.4 Search Behaviors and SSQ Responses
As external validation, we also examine whether the SSQ responses are consistent with respondents’
actual post-career-job search behaviors. Table 10 compares the acceptance rate of the offer under
different scenarios in SSQ1A (job offer at the time of the survey), for respondents grouped based on
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their search behavior.10 Allowing for a flexible schedule in the SSQs indeed had the largest impact
on those who actually searched for a flexible schedule. The increase in the acceptance rate due to
flexibility in work schedule for that group (26 percentage point) is larger than that for those who never
searched (18 percentage point) and for those who searched for other job characteristics (20 percentage
point). We observe the same pattern for the scenario with a preferred alternative occupation.11 Those
who actually looked for a job either in a different occupation or a different industry are more likely to be
able to think of an alternative occupation in the SSQ and are more likely to accept an offer conditional
on being able to think of an alternative. As a result, the impact of allowing an alternative occupation
on the acceptance rate is the largest for this group. The consistency between the SSQ responses
and actual search behavior suggests that the SSQ responses contain information on individuals’ true
preferences.
Table 10: Search behaviors and SSQ responses: SSQ1A acceptance rate
N Acceptance rate
Searched for Fixed Flexible Alternative
Did not search 1,188 33.7 51.5
Flexibility 63 34.9 71.4
Other than flexibility 84 33.3 64.3
Did not search 1,188 33.7 26.2
Alternative occupation/industry 53 39.6 47.2
Other than alternative occupation/industry 94 30.9 33.0
Notes: The tabulation includes only retirees who did not have a bridge job. In calculating the acceptance rate for
an alternative occupation scenario, those who cannot think of any alternative occupation are considered as not ac-
cepting the job. Hence the acceptance rate is calculated as the multiplication of two probabilities: whether they can
think of a preferred alternative occupation and whether they will accept the offer made in the preferred occupation.
4.4.5 Reasons for Separation and SSQ Responses
The first part of the survey includes a battery of questions adapted from the HRS concerning the
reasons for separation from the previous job. Respondents are asked to choose the most important
reason from options such as retirement, family obligation, health issues, etc. Most retirees (in particular
90% of those who retired from the career job) report that they quit to retire.12 Yet, some indicate that
they left involuntarily by reporting exogenous reasons such as being laid off, discharged, and employer
10We run this test only for the retirees who did not have a bridge job. For those who had a bridge job, what they
were looking for after quitting the career job, e.g., fewer working hours, might have already been reflected in the bridge
job they actually had, which serves as the reference job in the SSQ. If that is the case, allowing for further flexibility in
the SSQ may have limited effect for them.
11Those who cannot think of an alternative occupation are included as not accepting an offer in that scenario.
12We debated whether or not to include retirement on the list of choices because it obscures the reason for retirement,
but for comparability with the HRS we included it.
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closing or selling the business.
We expect those who left their last job involuntarily to be more likely to accept an offer made at
the time of that separation. Table 11 confirms that this is indeed the case. In both fixed and flexible
schedule scenarios in SSQ1B (job offer at the time of retirement), the acceptance rate is higher for
those who report being involuntarily separated from the last job. The difference is larger for those who
retired directly from their career jobs. This pattern suggests that many who separated voluntarily
wanted to have at least some time off while those who separated involuntarily would have been more
likely to continue working as long as they found a reasonably good offer.
Table 11: Reasons for separation and SSQ responses: SSQ1B acceptance rate
Group Separation reason Fixed Flexible N
Retired, no bridge job involuntary 50.4 57.0 130
voluntary 29.9 43.1 1,105
Retired, had a bridge job involuntary 67.0 73.0 100
voluntary 60.5 66.6 334
Notes: A separation is classified as involuntary if the respondent mentioned any of “laid off”, “dis-
charged”, “employer closed business”, “employer sold business.” If a separation is not classified as
involuntary it is considered to be voluntary.
4.5 Summary
The SSQs reveal a strong and prevalent willingness to work among older Americans. One third of
retirees report being willing to work again at the time of the survey, even if they could not choose the
number of working hours, as long as they could find a job that has the similar characteristics as the
last job they had. Many of them also report being willing to take a significant wage reduction to have
such a job opportunity. The estimated willingness to work is much stronger than what one could infer
from the behavioral data only. This demonstrates the importance of controlling for the demand-side
factors, or workers’ perceptions of those factors, in measuring willingness to work late in life.
The SSQs also suggests older workers’ strong preference for flexibility in their work schedules.
Allowing for flexibility not only increases the acceptance rate at the reference wage (by 20 percentage
points at the time of the survey) but also increases the wage reduction the workers are willing to
accept. This suggests that the increase in the share of jobs with a flexible schedule among bridge jobs
documented in the previous section is at least in part driven by workers’ preferences.
Though the SSQs are asked with hypothetical job opportunities, ex-post tests of the credibility of
the responses suggest that such purpose-designed questions can elicit reasonable information about
respondents’ true preferences.
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5 IES Estimation Using the SSQs
SSQ responses indicate a stronger preference for reduced hours and greater flexibility among older
Americans than observed retirement patterns imply. Furthermore, as recently highlighted in Rogerson
and Wallenius (2013, RW hereafter), the prevalence of abrupt retirements is puzzling in the context
of standard models of labor supply. In RW’s model, production nonconvexities and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of labor supply (IES) determine retirement but are not separately identified.
For IES values consistent with most empirical estimates, large nonconvexities are necessary to generate
abrupt retirement. In this section we extend this work by combining SSQ responses with RW’s model to
identify IES independently from production nonconvexities and estimate the IES for each respondent.
Our estimates suggest IES values consistent with previous micro-estimates, providing further evidence
that demand side constraints or production nonconvexities are responsible for the prevalence of binary
labor force exits.
We first document the relationship between production nonconvexities, the IES, and hour-profiles/labor
force exit, as well as the challenge in identifying the IES in the presence of nonconvexities. We then
show that SSQ responses identify the IES independent of production nonconvexities and present our es-
timated IES distribution. Finally, as a credibility check, we show that the IES estimates are intuitively
correlated with search behavior.
5.1 The Identification Problem with Behavioral Data Alone
The IES is a key parameter in studying retirement behavior, as it determines how individuals want
to allocate the hours they work over their lifetime. An individual with a low IES wants to smooth
hours worked over time, while an individual with a high IES is comfortable with highly variable hours
worked over the life cycle, including possibly periods of full time work and full retirement.
As noted in RW, there is an inconsistency between the low IES commonly estimated in micro
studies and that typically needed in models to rationalize observed retirement behavior: generating an
abrupt retirement requires an IES much larger than one, but most of the empirical studies (leveraging
labor supply responses to tax changes) suggest an IES much smaller than one (see Keane, 2011, for a
survey). To reconcile this inconsistency, RW propose introducing a nonconvexity in production that
limits workers’ desire to choose to work part-time in route to labor force exit. Of course, this suggests
that inferring the IES from behavioral data is contingent on the assumed strength of production
nonconvexity. In fact, for any observed retirement behavior, any value of the IES may be justified if
one can freely choose the strength of production nonconvexity.
The model used in RW is as follows. In a general version of their model with age-dependent
preferences and wages, nonconvexity in production, and time and expenditure fixed costs of work, a
household chooses ct and ht to solve:
max
∫ T
t=0
[
U(ct) + αt
(1− eh¯− ht)1−1/γ
1− 1/γ
]
dt (1)
s.t.
∫ T
t=0
(ct + ec¯)dt =
∫ T
t=0
wth
(1+θ)
t dt+ Y, (2)
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where t is the age subscript, ht is the amount of labor supplied (normalized as a fraction of the total
time endowment), γ parameterizes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for leisure consumption
(the IES is γ 1−htht ), αt is the weight on utility from leisure, θ captures the nonconvexity in production,
wt is the scalar that determines the age-profile of wage, e is an indicator function for currently working,
h¯ and c¯ are time and expenditure fixed costs of working, and Y is the entire life-time resources other
than labor earnings. Let ωt denote the hourly wage. It is an increasing function of the number of
hours worked (ωt = wth
θ
t ), which captures the disadvantage to part-time working. For simplicity, it is
assumed that there is no uncertainty, no time discounting, and that the interest rate is zero.
Suppose that either αt is increasing or wt is decreasing over age. Then households would want to
work more when younger and less when older. More importantly, given the values of the fixed costs of
working (c¯ and h¯), if the IES is high or the nonconvexity in production (θ) is strong, then this incentive
is sufficiently strong to generate a direct transition from working full-time to retirement. The exact
condition that characterizes this relationship is:
θ ≥ (1− cˆ)h0(1− 1/γ) 1
(1− h¯− h0)1/γ(1− (1− h¯− h0)1−1/γ)
− 1, (3)
where h0 is the number of hours on the full-time job.
13 This equation relates the IES and θ. When the
IES is higher, the household is more sensitive to the disadvantages associated with part-time working
(the fixed costs and nonconvexity in production), so it is more discouraged from working part-time
and more likely to choose a direct transition to retirement. In addition, when θ is higher, the hourly
wage reduction associated with part-time working becomes larger, so the household faces a larger
disadvantage to part-time working. Thus, for a higher θ, direct retirements can be rationalized with
a lower value of the IES.
Figure 6 presents this trade-off graphically by plotting equation 3, with the shaded region corre-
sponding to the parameter space that can generate abrupt retirements.14 Following RW, we assume
that the fixed cost of working in terms of foregone leisure is 4% of time endowment (h¯ = 0.04) and
the fixed cost in terms of expenditure is 14% of the full-time earning (cˆ = 0.14, where c¯ = cˆw0h
(1+θ)
0 ).
We use these values as our baseline calibration for all following exercises.15 In addition to highlighting
the role of the IES and nonconvexity in production in generating retirement from full-time work, this
figure also reveals the identification challenge associated with using behavioral data only (the direct
transition to retirement in this case). While the observed behavior excludes certain combinations
of these two factors—all of the parameter values outside of the green area can be ruled out—there
remains a substantial area of the parameter space that can rationalize transitions from full-time work
to retirement. Any value of the IES can be consistent with the observed behavior depending on the
assumed value of θ. For example, if θ is 0.3, then the IES needs to be higher than 0.9 to explain the
observed retirement (blue line in Figure 6). But if θ is 1, then the IES can be as low as 0.4 (red line
in Figure 6). The opposite is also true: any value of θ can be justified depending on the value of the
13We can abstract from changes in αt and wt as long as these profiles are continuous, since we are focusing on a
transition that happens at a moment in a continuous time model.
14In this example, full-time work is calibrated as 2,000 hours per year, or h0 = 0.385, which is common among career
jobs of the VRI sample as well as the HRS sample.
15In Appendix D we report results from alternative calibrations.
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IES. If we can pin down one of the two parameters using an additional source of information, then
the observed behavior places bounds on the values the other parameter can take. This motivates our
estimation of the IES using the SSQs.
Figure 6: Required IES and θ to generate retirement from full-time work
Note: The green area contains the combinations of the IES and θ that are consistent with a direct transition
from full-time work to retirement when full-time work is calibrated as h0 = 0.385 (2,000 hours per year). The
boundary of the area corresponds to equation (3).
5.2 Identifying IES using SSQ Responses
The SSQs collect two different wage and hour pairs (under a fixed and flexible schedule) that make an
individual indifferent to working or exiting the labor market. In this section we demonstrate that this
is sufficient to identify an individual’s IES, independent of the nonconvexity in production. Relative
to the reference job, a respondent with a low IES would be willing to accept a large wage reduction to
be able to work less hours. Intuitively, this is because such a response suggests a steeper increase in
the marginal disutility of work, which in turn signals a lower IES. We formally derive this relationship
below.
First, suppose that h0 is the number of hours respondents have to work in the fixed schedule
scenario and ωfixed is the hourly wage that makes respondents indifferent between accepting this job
offer and not working for the considered moment. If we assume that the marginal value of resources,
λ, is not affected by this choice (which is a good approximation for the VRI sample because they have
high financial wealth and relatively short remaining time to work), the reservation wage is defined
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such that:
αt
(
1
1− 1/γ −
(1− h¯− h0)1−1/γ
1− 1/γ
)
= λ(h0ωfixed(1− cˆ)), (4)
where αt may depend on the time the question concerns (i.e., the time of the survey as in SSQ1A vs.
the time of retirement as in SSQ1B). The left-hand side is the foregone utility from giving up leisure
to work the fixed number of hours, while the right-hand side is the value of income from this job.
Second, let hflex be the number of hours chosen under the flexible schedule scenario and ωflex be
the hourly wage that makes respondents indifferent between accepting this offer and not working for
the considered moment. At the reservation wages, the utility level is the same between working on a
fixed schedule and working on a flexible schedule, yielding the following relationship:
αt
(
(1− h¯− hflex)1−1/γ
1− 1/γ −
(1− h¯− h0)1−1/γ
1− 1/γ
)
= λ(h0ωfixed − hflexωflex), (5)
where the left-hand side is the foregone leisure by working longer hours and the right-hand side is the
value of additional income from working longer.
By dividing equation (4) by equation (5) and rearranging terms, we get:
ωflex
ωfixed
=
h0
hflex
(
1− (1− cˆ)((1− h¯− hflex)
1−1/γ − (1− h¯− h0)1−1/γ)
1− (1− h¯− h0)1−1/γ
)
. (6)
Since we are using two questions that place the individual at the same point in time, the time-varying
weight on leisure-utility (αt) and the marginal utility of income (λ) cancel out. Under the calibrated
values of fixed costs of working (h¯ and cˆ), the only unknown variable in equation 6 is γ, so we can
determine its value using this condition and observed responses hflex, ωfixed, and ωflex.
Equation (6) is basically an indifference curve. For a given value of the IES (or γ), it determines the
pairs of {hflexh0 ,
ωflex
ωfixed
} that make the individual indifferent between working under the fixed schedule
and the flexible schedule.16 Figure 7 plots the indifference curves for various values of the IES. The
lower is the IES, the steeper is the indifference curve. The marginal disutility of work increases faster
with a lower IES, hence a worker with a lower IES would accept a larger wage reduction for a given
reduction in hours. As the IES increases, the curve becomes flatter.17 This demonstrates why the IES
is a key parameter in explaining the retirement behavior in RW’s model. When the IES is low, the
workers would still want to work part-time as long as the penalty for part-time working coming from
the nonconvexity in production is not too large, since the reservation wage reduces significantly when
the number of hours is reduced. On the other hand, for those with a high IES, a small penalty for
part-time working is enough to discourage them from working part-time and hence to induce them to
choose retirement instead.
16The level of ωfixed is fixed to satisfy equation (4).
17In the absence of fixed costs of working, the curves are always upward-sloping and it converges to the horizontal
curve as the IES goes to infinity. Fixed costs of working create negative slopes either when the IES is very high or the
reduction in the number of hours is large, to compensate for the increase in the average cost of working when the number
of hours are reduced.
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Figure 7: SSQ responses and IES: Indifference curves
Note: Each curve connects the pairs of { hflexhfixed ,
ωflex
ωfixed
} that make the worker with the considered value of IES
indifferent between working under the fixed schedule and flexible schedule scenario, under h0 = 0.385,
h¯ = 0.04, and cˆ = 0.14. The figure zooms in the range [0.5, 1.0] for
hflex
h0
where most of the responses fall.
Under the baseline calibration, some responses cannot be rationalized with any value of the IES.
For some of these responses, we can assign them either top- or bottom-coded values of the IES,
by extending the logic of the RW model and allowing the fixed costs to be heterogeneous. Some
respondents (4%) choose a number of hours under a flexible schedule that is too small to be justified
under the baseline fixed costs. But such responses can be rationalized with lower fixed costs and a low
IES. Thus, we assign a low value of IES (0.05) to these responses. On the other hand, some respondents
(10%) demand an hourly wage increase for working less hours that is too large to be justified under
the baseline fixed costs. Such responses can be rationalized with larger fixed costs and a high IES. We
assign a high value of the IES (10) to such responses. However, those responses where total earnings
from working less hours is greater than or equal to that from working full time (ωflexhflex ≥ ωfixedh0,
the area above the dotted curve in Figure 7) cannot be justified under any labor supply model with
utility value of leisure regardless of the values of the fixed costs, so they are dropped from the analysis
(10% of the sample).
Furthermore, some responses do not reveal relevant information for the IES estimation so they
are not included in the estimation. Those who choose to reject both offers at any reasonable wage
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do not provide relevant information for the estimation (37% of the sample).18 These individuals may
indeed have low IES since allowing flexibility does not change their decision to retire, though it is not
operational because they also have low preference for work later in life (high αt). Respondents who
report the same number of hours and reservation wages in both scenarios provide only one effective
observation, which is not enough to construct the indifference curve needed for estimation (10% of the
sample).
5.3 IES Estimates
Figure 8 shows the cumulative distribution of the estimated IES under the baseline calibration of the
fixed costs.19 The median estimates are 0.45 from SSQ1A and 0.83 from SSQ1B. These are well in line
with findings from the microeconomic literature: the average among the estimates from the studies
examined in Keane (2011) is 0.31. Recent works including Domeij and Floden (2006) and Chetty
(2012) show that accounting for frictions such as credit constraints and adjustment costs can lead to
a larger estimate: Chetty (2012) suggests 0.5 as a reasonable estimate. RW argues that under the
values of the nonconvexity in production that are often used in the literature the IES needs to be at
least 0.75 to explain the observed retirement behavior.
Figure 8: Distribution of IES estimates
Notes: The curves represent CDFs of the estimated IES. N=796 for SSQ1A and N= 668 for SSQ1B.
Our estimates do not rely on the strength of the nonconvexity in production. In fact, given the
RW model, our estimates provide a range of the nonconvexity in production that are in line with a
18If the reservation wage is given in one scenario but not in the other, we assume a high reservation wage for the latter
(twice of the reference wage).
19See Appendix Figure D.4 for the results from alternative calibrations.
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transition from full time work to retirement. According to Figure 6, the median IES estimate from
SSQ1A (0.45) suggests that θ needs to be larger than one to generate such a retirement pattern while
that from SSQ1B (0.83) suggests a range above 0.35 (c.f., French, 2005, uses 0.4). Any value below
this threshold cannot be consistent with a retirement from full-time work for more than half of the
sample.
We also estimate significant heterogeneity in the IES. For about a quarter of respondents, the IES
is less than 0.2 while for another quarter it is larger than 5. The former group will find part-time
working attractive even when θ is as high as 3. The latter group will choose retirement over part-time
work even in the absence of the nonconvexity (θ = 0) since the fixed costs are enough to discourage
them from working part-time.
5.4 IES Estimates and Measured Search Behavior
The RW model we build upon predicts that individuals with a lower IES value part-time options
more. Relying on this relationship, we provide evidence supporting the validity of our IES estimates
by examining whether the IES estimates predict searching for flexibility, conditional on searching for
a job opportunity, after a career job exit.20 To avoid confounding the analysis due to differences in
reference job type (bridge vs. career), we study those who had a bridge job.21 We use a tobit regression
to account for the top- and bottom-coding of the IES. Because the IES is right skewed, we consider a
log specification.
Table 12 reports the association between the log of the IES estimates and searching for a flexible
schedule controlling for key demographic variables including gender, marital status, and age, last job
characteristics such as whether had a flexible schedule or not and the number of hours, and a dummy
variable for the SSQ from which the IES is estimated. The point estimate suggests that, as predicted
by the model, those who searched for flexibility indeed have a lower IES. They have on average 50%
lower IES than those who did not look for flexibility. Notwithstanding the small sample size, the
estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level. This result provides evidence that the estimated
IES distribution captures true heterogeneity in preferences. The other coefficients, though some with
large estimated effects, are statistically insignificant. Since the IES estimates are based on SSQs that
are designed to extract preferences, the insignificance of these coefficients is a desired outcome.
6 Related Literature
This paper relates to a number of literatures. First, we contribute to empirical literature that examines
employment patterns late in life, both by documenting the post-career-job work history and search
behaviors of the VRI sample and by eliciting their willingness to work using hypothetical questions.
Beginning with Ruhm (1990) and more recently documented by Maestas (2010) and Rupert and Zanella
(2015), it has long been established that not taking a typical retirement path (i.e., direct transition
from full time career job to full retirement) is becoming more common, with Cahill, Giandrea and
20We focus on what they searched for instead of what they have found, since the latter is more affected by the available
jobs in the market.
21The vast majority of those who did not have a bridge job did not search.
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Table 12: IES estimates and search behavior
Variable Coefficient Standard error
Searched for flexibility -0.566* (0.309)
Single male 0.565 (0.538)
Coupled male 0.349 (0.407)
Coupled female -0.692 (0.552)
Age 0.017 (0.023)
Number of hours in the last job -0.000 (0.000)
Having a flexible schedule in the last job -0.066 (0.348)
Social capital occupation -0.097 (0.317)
Physical capital occupation 0.399 (0.585)
SSQ1B dummy 0.963* (0.289)
Note: N = 363. The dependent variable is the log of IES estimates. * indicates sig-
nificance under 10% level.
Quinn (2006) noting that post-career employment resembles initial labor market engagement decades
earlier. Many of these jobs are part time or lower paid, with the classical hump-shaped wage profile
reflecting workers willingness to take lower wages for less work (Cassanova, 2013). Furthermore, many
workers return to employment to gain access to employer sponsored health plans in particular before
becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65 (Madrian, Burtless and Gruber, 1994, Blau and Gilleski,
2008). Self-employment associated with fewer hours and lower earnings is also used as a transition
path to full retirement (Ramnath, Shoven, and Slavov, 2017). Of course, some returns to work do
not reflect workers’ preferences, with Chan and Stevens (2001) noting the volatile employment of
workers that are fired after age 50, and a number of studies noting the labor demand side constraints
that hinder post-career employment (e.g., Hurd, 1996, Scott, 2004, Kantarci and van Soest, 2008).
This paper documents that either having a bridge job before full-retirement or searching for such an
opportunity is not rare, but also that using behavioral data alone leads to under-estimation older
individuals’ willingness to work.
There exists a literature that empirically examines the effect of institutional incentives on late-in-
life labor supply. Many of these studies rely on aggregate data leveraging cross-country differences
or historical changes within countries in public pension benefit system (see for example Blondal and
Scarpetta, 1999, Gruber and Wise, 1999, Johnson, 2001, and Duval 2003). Others use variation in
retirement incentives across households that arise from public or private pension systems and public
medical insurance (see for example Blundell, Meghir and Smith, 2002, Gruber and Wise, 2002, Euwals,
van Vuuren, and Wolthoff, 2012, and Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai, 2016). While informative,
reactions to such policy incentives still combine the older individuals’ willingness to work and job
availability for them. This paper contributes to this literature by proposing an approach to disentangle
the roles played by supply- and demand-side factors behind the observed changes in the labor market
activities. The results in this paper show that for a policy to be effective in encouraging working longer
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it should address demand-side constraints.
There is a literature that matches structural models to observed retirement patterns to estimate
the importance of various institutions and policies in determining retirement behavior. Beginning with
Berkovec and Stern (1991), a number of papers subsequently highlighted the importance of minimum
hours constraints (Gustmanand and Steinmeier, 1984), social security (Gustmanand and Steinmeier,
1994, Rust and Phelan, 1997, French, 2005, Blau and Gilleskie, 2006, Van der Klaauw and Wolpin,
2008), and public and private health insurance (French and Jones, 2011). These papers also suggests
ways to overcome the identification issue associated with using only behavioral data. For example,
French (2005) addresses the selection bias in estimating the wage profile among older workers by
generating the same selection process from the model. Identifying all the key supply- and demand-
side parameters relying only on behavioral data is still challenging and these studies have to make
assumptions either on the level or distribution of certain key parameters. A key example is assumptions
on nonconvexity parameters as in French (2005). This paper contributes to this literature by providing
an alternative method to separately identify supply- and demand-side structural parameters separately,
so that a lifecycle model can provide better-informed predictions on the effectiveness of considered
policies.
Finally, this paper relates to two branches of survey literature. First, the SSQ survey instruments
we use in this paper reflect a methodological approach to surveys that attempt to structure survey
questions to inform preferences and model parameters in meaningful ways (Barsky, Juster, Kimball
and Shapiro, 1997, Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer and van Nieuwerburgh, 2011, Brown, Goda and McGarry,
2015, Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro and Tonetti, 2016, Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro and
Tonetti, 2017, Fuster and Zafar, 2016, among others). Second, we relate to a number of studies that
attempt to use surveys to measure factors that affect late-in-life labor supply decisions, including but
not limited to shares of older workers (Blau and Shvydko, 2011), career attachment and job satisfaction
(Gobeski and Beehr, 2009), pension and hours arrangements (van Soest, Kapteyn and Zissimopoulos,
2007, van Soest and Vonkova, 2014, Kantarci and van Soest, 2015), and disability (Kapteyn, Smith and
van Soest, 2007). Our study differs however due to the level of detail we include in our hypothetical
scenarios and the resulting quantitative measures that this approach delivers which can be directly
used to estimate parameters in retirement models.
7 Conclusion
By combining new behavioral data on late-in-life employment and job-search activity with hypothetical
SSQs, we find a strong and prevalent willingness to work among older Americans. At the time of the
survey, many individuals, even those years removed from their last job, would like to return to work if
they found a job similar to the last job they held. Individuals also expressed a willingness to continue
working at the time of retirement. The willingness to work is stronger when jobs offer a flexible choice
of hours worked. Individuals are willing to take substantial earnings reductions to gain hour flexibility.
From these findings we conclude that older Americans’ labor force participation near and after normal
retirement ages is limited more by a lack of acceptable job opportunities or low expectations about
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finding them, in particular jobs with part-time or flexible schedules, than by unwillingness to work
longer. Thus, demand-side factors (e.g., a nonconvexity in production that discourages part-time
hires) are likely to be important in explaining current late-in-life labor market behavior and may be
an appropriate target for policies aiming to promote working longer.
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A Appendix: Comparison with HRS Sample
This Appendix compares the VRI sample used in this paper, i.e., those who completed survey 4,
with the HRS sample from the 2012 wave, focusing on the job characteristics. (See Ameriks, Caplin,
Lee, Shapiro and Tonetti, 2014, for the more detailed comparisons using the entire VRI sample.)
We consider the HRS sample who are at least 55 years old to match the age eligibility for the VRI
sample (“age-eligible” sample). To account for the effects of the additional sampling screens used
in the VRI, that the respondents need to have at least $10,000 in their Vanguard accounts and be
internet eligible, we also consider the subset of the age-eligible HRS sample who have at least $10,000
in non-transactional accounts and have internet access (“VRI-eligible” sample) .
Table A.1 summarizes the key characteristics of the HRS sample (corresponds to Table 1 from the
VRI sample). The VRI sample tends to be wealthier, more educated, more likely to be married and
healthier, though a large part of this gap is explained by the screens imposed in the VRI sampling.
Labor force participation status is also similar between the VRI (Table 2) and HRS (Table A.2),
though the fraction of not completely retired respondents is higher in the HRS.
In terms of the characteristics of the career job (defined as the job with the longest tenure for the
HRS sample), the age-eligible HRS sample (Table A.3) has similar length of tenure, similar length of
working hour, and lower salary than the VRI sample (Table B.1). The gap in the salary is smaller
for the VRI-eligible HRS sample (Table A.4). The most common industries and occupations of that
sample also largely overlap with those from the VRI sample. Overall, these comparisons confirm that
once the sampling screens for the VRI are imposed on the HRS sample, the two sample have similar
job characteristics.
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Table A.1: The HRS sample characteristics
A. Age eligible Age and Wealth
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Age: 57 60 66 75 82 68
Financial wealth: -935 520 62,358 311,790 774,279 305,135
Married Education
Yes No < College College > College
51% 49% 71% 17% 12%
Sex Health
Excellent/ Fair/
Female Male Very Good Good Poor
52% 48% 42% 32% 26%
B. VRI eligible Age and Wealth
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Age: 56 59 64 70 77 65
Financial wealth: 35,336 101,889 283,690 685,939 1,296,840 600,788
Married Education
Yes No < College College > College
69% 31% 29% 41% 22%
Sex Health
Excellent/ Fair/
Female Male Very Good Good Poor
44% 56% 60% 28% 12%
Notes: The first panel uses all the financial respondents (the respondents who answered questions regarding
household finance in case there are multiple respondents in one household) who are age 55 or above (N=12,492).
For the second panel we impose additional criteria that they are internet eligible and have at least $10,000 in
non-transactional accounts (N=3,478). All the tabulations are weighted using the HRS sampling weights.
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Table A.2: Labor force participation status
By Age Total
55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-
A. Age eligible
Retired, completely (%) 16.9 36.7 57.2 70.6 86.1 52.3
Retired, not completely (%) 4.9 9.0 15.2 13.9 5.9 8.9
Not retired (%) 78.2 54.3 27.6 15.5 8.0 38.8
N 2,502 2,144 1,378 2,076 4,392 12,492
B. VRI eligible
Retired, completely (%) 10.3 26.6 47.8 63.0 81.7 38.2
Retired, not completely (%) 6.2 10.9 20.5 19.2 10.8 12.5
Not retired (%) 83.5 62.5 31.7 17.8 7.5 49.3
N 852 687 517 635 787 3,487
Notes: See the notes for Table A.1.
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Table A.3: Career Job Characteristics: Age-Eligible HRS
A. Retired from career job Years worked
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Years worked: 5 10 18 27 35 19
Most common industries: Manufacturing 15.3%
Health care and social assist 14.8%
Retail trade 8.9%
Most common occupations: Office and admin support 13.5%
Production 9.8%
Sales and related 9.2%
B. Working on career job Years worked, salary, hours worked
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Years worked: 5 11 20 30 37 21
Salary (in 2015$): 10,947 21,874 40,523 69,360 102,050 51,108
Hours worked (per year): 900 1,664 2,080 2,236 2,600 1,953
Self-employed: Yes 22.0%
No 78.0%
Most common industries: Manufacturing 17.4%
Health care and social assist 11.6%
Retail trade 7.4%
Most common occupations: Office and admin support 11.9%
Management 11.1%
Sales and related 9.6%
Notes: Career job is defined as the job with the longest tenure. This table uses all the financial respon-
dents who are age 55 or above and reported the tenure on their longest job (N=8,831 for Panel A and
N=1,844 for Panel B).
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Table A.4: Career Job Characteristics: VRI-Eligible HRS
A. Retired from career job Years worked
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Years worked: 8 13 20 29 35 21
Most common industries: Manufacturing 17.6%
Health care and social assist 11.5%
Educational services 9.0%
Most common occupations: Management 19.3%
Office and admin support 14.2%
Sales and related 10.6%
B. Working on career job Years worked, salary, hours worked
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Years worked: 10 15 23 32 37 23
Salary (in 2015$): 19,992 37,572 61,200 92,820 134,640 81,777
Hours worked (per year): 1,040 1,820 2,080 2,392 2,750 2,033
Self-employed: Yes 24.1%
No 75.9%
Most common industries: Health care and social assist 15.3%
Professional, scientific, tech. services 13.6%
Manufacturing 13.0%
Most common occupations: Management 17.4%
Office and admin support 11.9%
Business and financial operation 9.5%
Notes: Career job is defined as the job with the longest tenure. This table uses all the financial respon-
dents who are VRI-eligible and reported the tenure on their longest job (N=2,693 for Panel A and N=930
for Panel B).
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B Appendix: Additional Results from Behavioral Data
B.1 Career Job Characteristics
Table B.1 presents key characteristics of career jobs of the VRI sample, separately for those who
retired from their career jobs and those who are still working on their career jobs. Most of the career
jobs are full time jobs. The most common number of working hours is 2,080 per year, which is 40
hours per week for 52 weeks. Note that the average salary of those who are still working tends to
be lower due to reduced hours of some workers. More than half of the sample worked for more than
20 years. The most common industry is professional, scientific, and technical services while the most
common occupation is management. Self-employment is rare as is having a flexible schedule. In short,
this paper examines labor market transitions of those who were mainly employed on a long, full time
career job, that are typically more professional and less physically demanding, and typically had no
flexibility in their schedules. We find similar career job characteristics from the VRI-eligible HRS
sample (see Appendix Table A.4).
The career job characteristics are overall similar between those who have already quit and those
who are still working on their career jobs, though the latter group is more likely to be self-employed
and more likely to have a flexible schedule. This may be confounding two effects. On the one hand, it
maybe due to selection, that these are characteristics that encourage to work longer, so those who had
such job characteristics are more likely to stay in their career jobs. On the other hand, those who are
still working are also more likely to be in younger cohorts and those characteristics might be related
to that cohort. To disentangle these factors, we examine career job characteristics for those who are
still working on their career jobs over different age groups.
Table B.2 tabulates career job characteristics, among those who are still working on their career
jobs, for three different age groups: not older than 62, between 63 and 65, and older than 65. The
share of workers who are self-employed or have a flexible schedule increases with age, in particular
after 65. Only 9% of workers were self-employed before age 63. It goes up to 34% by age 65. The share
of having a flexible schedule changes from 36% to 71% between these two age groups. This finding
shows that it is primarily the selection effect that makes these characteristics more common among
those who are still on their career jobs compared to those who have already quit it. This, in turn,
suggests that these characteristics are preferred by older workers and hence encourage them to work
longer, consistent with the findings by Ramnath, Shoven, and Slavov (2017).
There are other patterns that are notable. The number of hours worked decreases significantly, in
particular on the left tail, after age 65. This suggests again that flexibility in the work schedule is more
valued in late life. Being able to reduce the work burden at the beginning of the pathway to retirement
seems to be appreciated by older workers. There is no noticeable change in hourly wage. This might
be a result of older workers being of lower productivity and therefore earning less and workers with
higher wages selecting into working longer canceling out each other. Note also that the share of jobs
with health insurance provision drops significantly at age 65. This may reflect older workers becoming
eligible for Medicare at this age.
There are also changes in the distribution of industries and occupations across the age groups.
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Those working in manufacturing or transportation and warehousing industries are less likely to stay
longer while those work in professional, scientific, and technical services or educational services are
more likely to stay longer. Those who have management positions tend to stay shorter while those
who have education-related occupations tend to stay longer.
These findings hint at the job characteristics that encourage workers to stay in their career jobs,
even after the normal retirement ages. Having control over their own work schedules (either through
self-employment or by having a flexible schedule) seems to be an important factor, and being able to
reduce the work burden at the beginning of the pathway to retirement turns out to be a key reason
they want to have it.
B.2 Career to Bridge Job Transition and Gaining Flexibility in Work Schedule
In this appendix we provide a more detailed decomposition of the share of bridge jobs with flexible
schedules. In particular, we investigate how much of it is driven by transitions into an industry or
occupation where having flexibility in schedule is more common versus increase in the share of flexible
jobs within each industry or occupation in bridge jobs compared to career jobs. In Table B.3, we list
the common industries and occupations among the sample who ever had a bridge job, along with the
share of career and bridge jobs in each category (second and third columns) and the share of jobs with
flexible schedules among the jobs in each category (the last two columns).22
We find that increases in the share of flexible jobs in each sector dominates the effect of transitions
to more flexible industries and occupations. The share of flexible jobs varies across industries and
occupations and there is indeed a tendency to switch to industries and occupations that are more
likely to offer a job with flexible schedule. For example, older workers tend to leave manufacturing
industry, which has the lowest share of flexible jobs, while educational services, other services, and
retail trade, which have higher shares of flexible jobs, attract more workers in late life. The extent of
such switches, however, turns out to be too small to explain the large increase in the share of flexible
jobs among bridge jobs. On the other hand, there is an increase in the share of flexible jobs within each
industry, and the size of that increase is comparable to the overall difference in the share of flexible
jobs between the bridge and career jobs. The same pattern also holds for occupations. Hence we
conclude that bridge jobs being more flexible is driven mainly by jobs in each industry and occupation
being more flexible not by transitions to more flexible industries and occupations.
22Among 20 industry categories and 23 occupation categories used in the survey, we present the most common 8
industries and occupations.
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Table B.1: Career Job Characteristics
A. Retired from career job Years worked, salary, hours worked
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Years worked: 8 14 22 31 37 22
Salary (in 2015$): 30,866 58,253 91,467 133,398 196,379 111,698
Hours worked (per year): 1,260 1,924 2,080 2,184 2,600 2,027
Self-employed: Yes 6.9%
No 93.1%
Had a flexible schedule: Yes 27.6%
No 72.4%
Health insurance provision: Yes 86.2%
No 13.8%
Most common industries: Professional, scientific, and technical services 17.8%
Manufacturing 14.5%
Educational services 12.7%
Most common occupations: Management 25.6%
Education, training, library 10.6%
Business and financial operations 9.8%
B. Working on career job Years worked, salary, hours worked
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Years worked: 8 14 21 30 38 22
Salary (in 2015$): 14,089 44,000 78,000 117,000 165,000 92,428
Hours worked (per year): 480 1,664 2,080 2,080 2,600 1,842
Self-employed: Yes 15.9%
No 84.1%
Had a flexible schedule: Yes 47.7%
No 52.3%
Health insurance provision: Yes 72.0%
No 28.0%
Most common industries: Professional, scientific, and technical services 18.6%
Manufacturing 10.7%
Educational services 10.5%
Most common occupations: Management 19.1%
Business and financial operations 11.3%
Computer and mathematical 9.0%
Notes: N=2,149 for Panel A and N=601 for Panel B.
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Table B.2: Career Job Characteristics: Workers, by Age Group
A. Age ≤ 62 Salary, hours worked, hourly wage
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Salary (in 2015$): 30,000 57,000 85,000 123,782 177,964 101,169
Hours worked (per year): 1,440 2,080 2,080 2,340 2,600 2,062
Hourly wage (in 2015$): 19 28 40 58 85 51
Self-employed: Yes 8.8%
No 91.2%
Had a flexible schedule: Yes 36.3%
No 63.7%
Health insurance provision: Yes 83.0%
No 17.0%
B. Age 63-65 Salary, hours worked, hourly wage
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Salary (in 2015$): 32,000 52,000 85,000 120,917 200,000 107,770
Hours worked (per year): 884 1820 2,080 2,250 2,600 1,944
Hourly wage (in 2015$): 19 28 42 58 120 62
Self-employed: Yes 11.0%
No 89.0%
Had a flexible schedule: Yes 50.9%
No 49.1%
Health insurance provision: Yes 85.4%
No 14.6%
C. Age ≥ 66 Salary, hours worked, hourly wage
10p 25p 50p 75p 90p Mean
Salary (in 2015$): 3,500 15,500 50,000 94,000 155,000 64,202
Hours worked (per year): 156 480 1,540 2,080 2,160 1,337
Hourly wage (in 2015$): 14 23 44 64 99 61
Self-employed: Yes 33.7%
No 66.3%
Had a flexible schedule: Yes 71.2%
No 28.8%
Health insurance provision: Yes 39.2%
No 60.8%
Notes: N=321 for group A, N=117 for group B, and N=163 for group C.
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Table B.2: Career Job Characteristics: Workers, by Age Group (Continued)
D. Share of selected industries Age group
≤62 63-65 ≥ 66
Professional, scientific, and technical services 17.7% 17.1% 21.5%
Manufacturing 12.8% 12.0% 5.5%
Transportation and Warehousing 11.8% 8.6% 3.1%
Health Care and Social Assistance 6.2% 12.8% 8.6%
Educational Services 7.5% 6.8% 12.9%
E. Share of selected occupations Age group
≤62 63-65 ≥ 66
Management 21.5% 22.2% 12.3%
Business and financial operations 9.4% 12.8% 14.1%
Computer and mathematical 9.0% 6.8% 10.4%
Office and administrative support 8.7% 10.3% 8.6%
Education, training, library 4.4% 3.4% 11.0%
Notes: N=321 for group A, N=117 for group B, and N=163 for group C.
Table B.3: Industry and Occupation: Prevalence and Flexibility
Share of
A: Industry Prevalence (%)* flexible jobs (%)**
Career Bridge Career Bridge
Professional, scientific, and technical services 23.0 20.6 26.7 59.9
Manufacturing 12.6 6.3 8.8 25.5
Educational services 9.7 11.3 31.7 52.2
Finance and insurance 9.4 9.6 17.1 51.3
Health care and social assistance 8.6 9.1 45.7 59.5
Public administration 8.1 7.0 15.2 31.6
Other services 4.7 8.6 34.2 67.1
Retail trade 3.1 5.5 32.0 62.2
Share of
B: Occupation Prevalence (%)* flexible jobs (%)**
Career Bridge Career Bridge
Management 26.2 18.6 20.7 49.0
Business and financial operations 11.1 12.7 23.3 63.1
Computer and mathematical 8.9 8.3 20.8 47.8
Architecture and engineering 8.5 6.7 17.4 51.9
Education, training, and library 7.5 9.2 39.4 60.0
Office and administrative support 6.9 9.1 14.3 37.8
Sales and related 6.4 8.1 21.2 51.5
Healthcare practitioners and technical 5.7 5.7 52.2 67.4
Notes: * Prevalence is defined as the share of career and bridge jobs that are in each industry/occupation among the
VRI sample who had a bridge job (N=812).
** This share is defined as the share of jobs with flexible schedule among the jobs in each industry/occupation in the
entire VRI sample, separately for career and bridge jobs.
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C Appendix: Detailed SSQ Scenarios
In Section 4.1, we presented details of the scenario with the fixed schedule, asked as of the survey
date (SSQ1A). In this Appendix we present the details of the other scenarios, focusing on differences
between the various scenarios.
C.1 SSQ1A: Choices at the Time of the Survey
Flexible Schedule Scenario
This scenario is the same as the fixed schedule scenario except that respondents are allowed to choose
the number of hours to work.
• Option A is a new employment situation that involves a flexible work schedule. Other
than this possible difference, it matches your reference employment situation in
terms of all other characteristics.
Then respondents are provided with more detailed rules, precisely defining what a flexible work sched-
ule means.
• You can change your regular work schedule at the start of each year but not again until
the start of the next year.
• You would have to let your employer know your choice of regular work schedule at the start
of the year and you would be expected to meet these work commitments. For example,
if you wanted to work half time, you could specify this as half days, or for half as many
weeks as usual on a seasonal basis.
• The annual pay is adjusted in proportion (from your reference salary) if you choose to
work more or less.
• If you choose option A, there are no restrictions on what you would do with the time that
you are not working.
Respondents are then asked about the preferred number of hours per week and number of weeks per
year for the following year. The reference salary is adjusted in proportion, and then respondents are
asked whether they would accept the offer or not, and then asked to report the reservation wage that
makes them indifferent between Option A and B.
Alternative Occupation Scenario
This scenario starts with the following question:
• Would there be an employment situation with a different occupation that you would prefer
to your reference employment situation under any circumstances?
If the answer is no, respondents skip this scenario. If the answer is yes, then Option A becomes:
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• Option A is a new employment situation that involves a fixed work schedule in
your most preferred alternative occupation. Other than this, the employment situation
matches your reference employment situation in terms of annual earnings, as well
as in as many other characteristics, to the maximum extent possible.
The remainder of the scenario is identical to the fixed schedule scenario.
C.2 SSQ1B: Choices at the Time of Retirement
The structure of SSQ1B is identical to that of SSQ1A except that it concerns choices over hypothetical
opportunities if they had been available at the time of retirement.23 SSQ1B starts with the following
preamble:
• In the questions that follow, we are interested in the employment situations that might
have been of interest to you in the past. Specifically, we will ask you to report the decision
you would have made immediately after your reference employment situation
ended.
• While it may be hard, we ask you not to answer in light of your current knowledge of what
happened since that time, but rather to answer in terms of how you would have behaved
if faced with particular employment opportunities at that time. The alternative should
be as you would have viewed it at that time, not as you now see it.
Other than the time at which the opportunity was available, there is no difference between SSQ1B
and SSQ1A. SSQ1B poses three scenarios, fixed schedule, flexible schedule, and alternative occupation,
structured precisely as in SSQ1A.
C.3 SSQ2: Options Allowed for the Current Job
In SSQ2, the opportunities to be considered involve possible continuation of the current job when
its characteristics are altered in various ways.24 Not accepting the offer means that the respondent
has to quit the current job immediately and pursue other possibilities including searching for anther
employment situation or not working. In addition to the value of having a flexible schedule, SSQ2
also considers the option value of being able to search for another job opportunity after quitting the
current job, by examining how responses change when respondents are allowed versus not allowed to
search after quitting the current job. SSQ2 considers four scenarios, (i) fixed schedule not allowing
for searching after the current job, (ii) flexible schedule not allowing for searching after the current
job, (iii) fixed schedule allowing for searching after the current job, and (iv) flexible schedule allowing
for searching after the current job.
The first scenario, in which the respondent has to work a fixed schedule and is not allowed to
search after the current job if decided to stay in the current job, is presented as follows:
23Hence SSQ1B is asked only to the retirees.
24Hence SSQ2 is asked only to those who are currently working.
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We are interested in the conditions under which you would want to stay in your reference
employment situation with a fixed work schedule. In the following scenario you must
decide between keeping your reference employment situation and instead quitting your current
employment situation immediately.
More specifically, you must choose between two options:
• Option A is to keep your reference employment situation with a fixed work sched-
ule. You may hold this employment situation for as long as you like. Once you exit this
employment situation you can no longer be employed in any other employment situation,
and must exit the labor force permanently.
• Option B is instead to pursue other possibilities including searching for another employ-
ment situation or not working.
Other scenarios are presented as simple variations of this scenario where the respondent either can
work a flexible schedule or is allowed to search after quitting the current job (or both).
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D Appendix: Additional Results from the SSQs
This Appendix shows the full distribution of reservations wages for all the SSQ scenarios, separately
for those who did not and who had a bridge job (Figure D.1 for SSQ1A, Figure D.2 for SSQ1B, and
Figure D.3 for SSQ2).25 Reservation wages are normalized as a fraction of the reference salary. It
being less than or equal to 1 means the respondent accepts the offer. Figures focus on the range of
the reservation wages between 0.5 and 1.5.
In Figure D.4 we show the distribution of IES estimates under different calibrations than the
baseline: no fixed cost of work in terms of foregone leisure (Panel (a)), no fixed expenditure cost of
work (Panel (b)), and no fixed cost of work at all (Panel (c)). The estimates tend to be larger in the
absence of fixed costs, though the overall pattern of the distribution is not sensitive to the assumed
values of fixed costs.
25Panel (a) and (b) of Figure D.1 and D.2 are included in the main text but also presented here for completeness in
describing the SSQ results.
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Figure D.1: Reservation wage distribution at the time of the survey (SSQ1A)
(a) Fixed vs. flexible schedule: had no bridge job (b) Fixed vs. flexible schedule: had a bridge job
(c) Alternative vs. reference job: had no bridge job (d) Alternative vs. reference job: had a bridge job
Note: Reservation wage is calculated as a fraction of the wage they had in the reference job. The vertical axis
represents CDF. The figure shows the range of reservations wages between 0.5 and 1.5. For Panel (c) and (d)
we include only those respondents who could think of any alternative occupation.
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Figure D.2: Reservation wage distribution at the time of retirement (SSQ1B)
(a) Fixed vs. flexible schedule: had no bridge job (b) Fixed vs. flexible schedule: had a bridge job
(c) Alternative vs. reference job: had no bridge job (d) Alternative vs. reference job: had a bridge job
Note: Reservation wage is calculated as a fraction of the wage they had in the reference job. The vertical axis
represents CDF. The figure shows the range of reservations wages between 0.5 and 1.5. For Panel (c) and (d)
we include only those respondents who could think of any alternative occupation. The figure also shows the
distributions from SSQ1A for the corresponding scenarios and groups in dashed curves for comparison.
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Figure D.3: Reservation wage distribution for continuing the current job (SSQ2)
(a) Had no bridge job (b) Had a bridge job
Note: Reservation wage is calculated as a fraction of the wage they had in the reference job. The vertical axis
represents CDF. The figure shows the range of reservations wages between 0.5 and 1.5.
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Figure D.4: Distribution of IES estimates: alternative calibrations
(a) No fixed leisure cost (b) No fixed expenditure cost
(c) No fixed cost
Notes: The curves represent CDFs of the estimated IES. N=796 for SSQ1A and N= 668 for SSQ1B.
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